In Buck Town Contractors & Co., the ASBCA denied the contractor's motion for partial summary judgment because the plain meaning of the contract was at variance with the contractor's proposed interpretation. The contractor had supported its argument with a dictionary definition of the disputed term, and the Board had to interpret the dictionary definition, itself, in order to evaluate the contractor's position.

In Securityhunter, Inc., the ASBCA held that paragraph (d) of FAR 52.216-22 (the "Indefinite Quantity" clause), which states in part that "the Contractor shall not be required to make deliveries under this contract after 365 days after contract award,"  did not relieve the contractor of its obligation to complete a fixed-price task order, whose original performance period was within the contract's term, simply because the contractor had not completed the work when the contract's term ended, noting: "Relieving [the contractor] of its contractual obligations to complete [the] work merely because it failed to perform on time would render the contract illusory and void [because the contractor] could simply decline to perform without any consequences." The Board also rejected the contractor's attempt to blame its performance delay on the Government because that delay claim had not previously been presented to the Contracting Officer for a decision.

In Great America Construction Co., the ASBCA held that the contractor had failed to prove that (i) it had performed one month of extra services and (ii) an authorized government representative had ordered the work (especially in light of a credible affidavit from the individual who had purportedly sent an email supporting the contractor's contentions denying she had sent the email and noting she had not even been employed by the Government at the time).

In UNIT Co., the ASBCA denied the Government's motion for summary judgment that the contractor had failed to provide timely, contractually-required notice of a discrepancy in the specifications or drawings under clause 52.236.21(a) because: (i) nothing precludes such notice from being found in an RFI; (ii) whether the RFIs at issue were sufficient to convey the notice was a disputed question of fact; and (iii) the Government had provided no evidence of prejudice from the alleged lack of notice, which is a requirement for resolving such issues.

HAL-PE Assocs. Engineering Services, Inc. won its appeal at the CBCA after the Government failed to identify any contract requirement for the extra work it had directed the contractor to perform.

In R.L. Persons Construction, Inc., the ASBCA denied the Government's motion for summary judgment that the contract lacked the positive indications of conditions at the site (which would be necessary for a finding of the Type I differing site condition alleged by the contractor) because the contract contained a latent ambiguity on this issue.

In Kellogg Brown & Root Services, Inc., the ASBCA denied the contractor's appeal of a Contracting Officer's decision denying the contractor's claim for subcontractor costs and asserting a government claim for subcontractor costs basically because the contractor had failed to implement an ACO's letter of technical direction (LOTD), which the Board determined was a type of document that the parties routinely treated as a directive that was to be followed by the contractor. Subsequently, the Board denied the contractor's motion to amend the judgment.

In Shams Walizada Construction Co., the ASBCA denied a claim for an allegedly "late payment" because the contractor failed to show it submitted a request for the original payment and because the claim was barred by a bilateral modification operating as a release and an accord and satisfaction.

In BCPeabody Construction Services, Inc., the CBCA held, inter alia, that: (i) the Government had delayed the contractor's work on a firm, fixed-price design build task order for an "unreasonably" long period (179 days) under the "Suspension of Work" clause, entitling the contractor to delay damages, including (a) general conditions and (b) some, but not all, of claimed personnel costs for its project managers, but (c) none of its claimed costs for unabsorbed home office overhead (because the suspension was for a definite period known in advance and the contractor did not prove that it incurred "standby" costs; (ii) the contractor was not entitled to recover for a Type II differing site condition (mainly because the Government was prejudiced by the contractor's failure to give timely notice of the alleged condition); (iii) the contractor was not entitled to recover for several alleged changes that actually were for items included in the fixed-price contract; (iv) the jury verdict method should be used to determine a reasonable approximation of the amount owed the contractor for another changes claim whose quantum was not susceptible of exact calculation; (v) the fixed-price nature of the contract precluded the agency from recovering for the contractor having to deliver less equipment than originally estimated in the task order; and (vi) the agency's claims for deficient work must be denied (because the agency did not prove the work it claimed was defective failed to meet the specification requirements and, even if it did not, the agency failed to provide the contractor with the opportunity to correct the work).

In Merrick Construction, LLC, the ASBCA held that the general release signed by the contractor, without any reservations or exceptions, as part of contract close-out in order to obtain final payment barred the contractor's subsequent claim, despite the contractor's attempts to raise various excuses (e.g., superior knowledge, unilateral mistake, mutual mistake) to avoid that result.

In DynCorp International LLC, the ASBCA denied the Government's motion for partial summary judgment based on alleged collateral estoppel because the issue  in a prior appeal on which the Government's motion was based (data incompleteness) differed from the issue in the current appeal (data inaccuracy). 

In JBG/Federal Center, L.L.C., the CBCA held: (i) it was appropriate to consolidate appeals involving separate contracts but the same issue; (ii) the plain language of a building lease precluded the lessor's recovery of real estate taxes on the parking garage except for the parking spaces specifically leased to the Government; and (iii) the portion of the Government's claim for repayment of excess real estate taxes reimbursed to the contractor prior to September 2010 was barred by CDA's six-year limitations period.

In PJP Building Six, LC, a decision involving contract interpretation, the CBCA held that: (i) a building lease permitted VA to terminate only at the end of its first 60 months, not at any time thereafter; and, therefore, (ii) the VA was liable for early termination of the lease after eight years of its ten year term. The Board rejected the VA's proffer of extrinsic evidence because the lease provision at issue was not ambiguous (the parties having marked-up the original lease document to essentially rule out the VA's current interpretation).

In Mare Solutions, Inc., which consolidated different appeals, each involving the interpretation of a contract for the construction of a parking garage at a VA medical center, the CBCA held, inter alia, that: (i) the testimony by the contractor's two experts as to where expansion couplings were required to be installed was persuasive; and (ii) a conflict between the specifications and drawings was resolved by the order of precedence provision stating that the specifications would take precedence and, therefore, the contractor was required to provide the head-end equipment for the video surveillance system.

The ASBCA denied an appeal by Black Tiger Co. because the Government presented credible, unrebutted evidence that no contract existed between the parties and that no equipment had been delivered by the appellant.

In Cubic Defense Applications, Inc., the ASBCA denied a motion for summary judgment because a release and settlement agreement exempted claims that arose in the future and the contractor's claim regarding its assertion of limited data rights arose after that execution of the agreement.

In Patrick M. Murray, the PSBCA held, inter alia, that the contractor (i) was not excused from further performance simply because he disagreed with a government direction to comply with one of the contract's specific requirements and (ii) did not establish that he signed a contract extension that contained the disputed requirement under duress when he was free simply to have declined to extend the contract. 

In Relyant, LLC, the ASBCA held that, although the Government was under no obligation to  change the SOW's requirements, it unreasonably delayed in responding to the contractor's repeated requests to do so, knowing that the delays in responding were causing the contractor to incur additional costs. Subsequently, the Board denied the contractor's motion for partial reconsideration.

In General Dynamics Information Technology, after determining that the contract allocated to the contractor the duty of locating the utilities at a construction site, the ASBCA held that costs of repairing a utility "strike" (damage) were the contractor's responsibility.

The ASBCA denied an appeal by Team Hall Venture, LLC, dba Limeberry Frozen Yogurt involving a claim for breach damages because the contract termination agreement signed by the contractor specifically waived all further monetary claims.

In CiyaSoft Corp., although the ASBCA held that it lacked jurisdiction over allegations not included in the claims originally submitted to the Contracting Officer and that certain other allegations must fail for lack of proof, the Board concluded that the Government had violated the terms of a commercial software license agreement that was part of the contract by (i) permitting the installation of a single copy of the software onto more than one computer, and (ii) failing to provide the contractor with a list of the registered users--all this despite the fact that the Contracting Officer had no idea what was contained in the software licenses. Subsequently, the Board denied the Government's motion for reconsideration.

In North American Landscaping, Construction, and Dredge, Co., the ASBCA, inter alia, found that, as part of a pattern of overreaching by the Contracting Officer beginning with contract inception, a release in a settlement agreement signed by the contractor was ineffective because the contractor's signature had been obtained only under duress, specifically the improper threat of a default termination and a forced bankruptcy.

In CDM Constructors, Inc., the ASBCA granted the Government's motion for summary judgment because the delay damages claimed by the contractor were not caused by the suspension of work during a bid protest.

In Pros Cleaners, the CBCA denied a claim alleging the Government had failed to order the required services under what the appellant maintained was an ID/IQ contract because: (i) although the solicitation had referred to an ID/IQ contract, the document, itself, did not include a guaranteed minimum quantity and, thus, was defective for lack of consideration; and (ii) the Government had never ordered any services from the appellant.

In TranLogistics LLC, a decision partially involving contract interpretation, the ASBCA held that: (i) the contractor's shipment delays at the border were excused because, contrary to the Government's position, the Government was responsible for providing the customs documentation and failed to timely do so; and (ii) the contractor was entitled to the remaining balance of the contract price but not to (a) claimed amounts for delays that were excusable but not compensable and (b) claimed costs of compensable delays for which it did not provide adequate proof.  Subsequently, the contractor's motion for reconsideration was granted because the time and cost of demurrage was adequately identified in its subcontractor's invoice.

In Penna Group, LLC, the CBCA denied the contractor's appeal involving a claim for extra work because the Government had made final payment in reliance on a form releasing all claims, which bore a stamp of the company President's signature, despite the fact that the President later claimed he had not authorized the employee with the stamp to use it on the release document.

In Parsons Evergreene, LLC, a very lengthy opinion concerning a plethora--too many to summarize here--of quantum and entitlement issues on various claims concerning the "completion of design and construction" phase of a contract with a non-appropriated funds instrumentality (NAFI) to construct a temporary lodging facility and visitors quarters at McGuire AFB, the ASBCA held, inter alia, that: (i) the Government (improperly) failed to alert appellant to possible mistakes in its bid (which bid the Board finds reasonable); (ii) the Government failed to challenge specific elements of the contractor's claimed costs, which means its incurred costs are deemed reasonable; (iii) the contractor was not entitled to recover on its subcontractor "buyout" overrun claims because the contractor had failed to lock in its subcontract prices in a timely manner; and (iv) although the CAFC has explicitly declined to address the continued viability of the so-called "NAFI doctrine" as it applies to board appeals, the ASBCA concludes it has CDA jurisdiction over this NAFI appeal and that, therefore, the contractor is entitled to CDA interest on the amounts found owing on its claims.

In SKE Base Services GmbH, a decision involving contract interpretation, the ASBCA held that: (i) the only reasonable interpretation of the plain language of a housing maintenance services contract's Variable Monthly Workload Calculation clause  was that it allowed for price adjustments only for changes in the number of housing units to be maintained, not for changes in the number of service calls; and (ii) the contractor's erroneous prediction of the number of service calls that would be required under the contract did not establish the elements necessary for reformation of the contract due to a mutual mistake of fact.

The CBCA denied an appeal by Adams and Assocs., Inc. because, pursuant to the terms of  its cost-plus-incentive-fee contract (specifically, the requirements of FAR 31.205-36), after the sale and leaseback of a building, the contractor was limited  to the normal costs of ownership of the building, rather than being able to recoup full rental charges as it had sought to do.

In OMNIPLEX World Services Corp., a decision involving contract interpretation, the CBCA held that a guard services contract's provisions unambiguously permitted the agency to take the deductions it had when an open post occurred (i.e., when a post was unstaffed or staffed by one who failed to meet contract requirements) and that, even if there had been an ambiguity, it was patent, placing on the contractor the duty to inquire.

The CBCA sustained an appeal by Outback Firefighting, Inc., holding that the contractor was entitled to recover its costs to repair equipment (tents) rented to the Forest Service after a severe windstorm damaged the tents before the contractor could take them down after the Forest Service had left the site because the contract provisions assigned the risk of loss to the Government until the equipment was returned to the contractor's facilities and because a windstorm could not be considered "ordinary wear and tear" or "mechanical failure" within the meaning of the relevant contract provision. 

In CDM Constructors, Inc., the ASBCA held, inter alia, that: (i) concept drawings provided by the Government for a generator were defective specifications because the Government rejected a contractor design that followed those drawings;  and (ii) requiring the contractor to use a 0.8 evaporation coefficient only if the maximum water depth was three feet or less constituted a constructive change because the contract documents did not require any particular evaporation coefficient for any particular water depth. Subsequently, the Board denied the Government's motion for reconsideration.

In Tidewater, Inc., the ASBCA held that the contractor had failed to establish the elements for a Type I differing site conditions claim because adverse weather, alone, does not constitute a basis for such claims, and there were no indications in the contract of soil conditions differing from those the contractor actually encountered.

In Ruby Emerald Construction Co., the ASBCA held that an unambiguous, bilateral modification cancelling a contract at no cost operated as an accord and satisfaction barring the contractor's subsequent claim.

The ASBCA held in John C. Grimberg Co., inter alia, that: (i) the contractor had encountered a Type I differing site condition in the form of rock quantities that greatly exceeded the indications in the contract; and (ii) the contractor was entitled to a portion of its claimed impact costs from delays associated with the differing site condition. Subsequently, the ASBCA denied the Government's motion for reconsideration.

In ECC International, LLC, the ASBCA held that the contractor was not entitled to extra compensation for the Government's closure of the Friendship Gate access route to a construction site in Afghanistan because: (i) the Government did not create an implied warranty of access through the Gate by approving the contractor's security plan; (ii) prior contracts between contractor and various agencies did not amount to a course of dealing establishing a contractual right under the current contract to use the Gate; and (iii) access through the Gate was not a contract requirement so its loss could not be a constructive change to the contract. The case boiled down to the fact that the contract and the circumstances clearly put the contractor on notice that security concerns made the performance environment unpredictable.

In L&M Technologies, Inc., the ASBCA had to resolve issues concerning the meaning of a contract provision concerning the amount the contractor was permitted to bill for indirect rates and whether a contract modification operated as a release or accord and satisfaction, and the Board used the rules of contract interpretation to decide both issues. The Board also resolved the question of which of two diametrically opposed declarations should be accepted by looking at contemporaneous documentation to determine which declaration was more consistent with it.

In First Kuwaiti Trading & Contracting, W.L.L., the CBCA parsed a sentence in a way that would thrill my high school English teachers and concluded, inter alia, that the "War Risks" clause in a fixed-price contract did not permit the contractor to recover on claims for danger pay to its employees or delays encountered by truck convoys.

In Charles F. Day & Assocs. LLC, the ASBCA held that: (i) it lacked jurisdiction over a claim on appeal that was based on different operative facts from the claim originally presented to the Contracting Officer; (ii) the contractor failed to prove that any out-of-scope work it performed actually increased its costs of performance; (iii) the contractor failed to meet the high burden of proof required to establish that it entered a bilateral modification only under duress; and (iv) contrary to the contractor's contention, that modification was supported by consideration.

In Expresser Transport Corp., the ASBCA granted the Government's motion for summary judgment and held that the contractor had waived its claim for indemnification under a time charter vessel contract by failing to submit the claim within two years of vessel redelivery in accordance with a clear contract provision entitled "Waiver of Claims" that required "all claims" to be submitted within that period of time. In light of the unambiguous contract provision, the Board rejected the contractor's requests for discovery as unnecessary and because they "do not rise above the level of a speculative hope, and amount to little more than the suggestion that something might turn up."

Terminations/Liquidated Damages/Government Claims

 The ASBCA denied a convenience termination claim by American Boys Construction Co. because the contractor failed to submit its termination settlement proposal within one year of the termination.

In J.R. Mannes Government Services Corp., the CBCA denied an appeal because the contractor failed present anywhere near enough evidence to support its allegation that the Government's bad faith motivated a termination for convenience.

The ASBCA dismissed an appeal by Abdul Khabir Construction Co. because the contractor failed to submit its termination settlement proposal within one year of its termination for convenience.

In Green Bay Logistic Services Co., the ASBCA denied a convenience termination claim because the contractor had not performed any percentage of the contract work prior to the termination, i.e., it had failed to deliver any leased vehicles that met the contract requirements.

In OCCI, Inc., the ASBCA denied an appeal from the Government's assessment of liquidated damages for late completion because the contractor failed to submit any (defensive) CDA claims asserting entitlement to time extensions, as required by the CAFC's precedent in M. Maropakis Carpentry, Inc.

In American International Contractors, Inc., the ASBCA held, inter alia, that the Government was entitled to retain liquidated damages for the portion of the work separate from additional work added by a contract modification that established a new delivery date just for that work.

In AEY, Inc., which involved consolidated appeals from multiple default terminations of CLINs in related contracts for ammunition that the ASBCA, nevertheless, determined were severable contracts, the Board sustained most of the challenges because, inter alia,:  (i) absent a cure notice, the termination of CLINs not yet due was improper; and (ii) the Government waived the original contract delivery dates in several instances by inaction in the face of notices of delays from the contractor.

In Coastal Environmental Group, Inc., the ASBCA held that: (i) under the applicable law of the contractor's state of incorporation, the corporation's dissolution after the date of a default termination did not deprive the contractor of its right to contest the termination; (ii) the  Government's termination for failure to make progress was reasonable because 50 days prior to the contract completion date, the contractor notified the Government it "intended" to mobilize "within the next three weeks" where it had previously provided the Government a schedule showing mobilization would require three days and then contract work would require an additional 58 days; and (iii) the contractor had waived any claims for excusable delays by the release language in a bilateral mod lifting a stop work order. In another Coastal Environmental Group, Inc., appeal involving the same default termination, the ASBCA held it lacked jurisdiction over the terminated contractor's appeal seeking to recovery monies its surety agreed to pay the Government for reprocurement charges because the terminated contractor was not party to that agreement between the surety and the Government.

In ECC CENTCOM Constructors, LLC , the ASBCA upheld a default termination because: (i) based on controlling CAFC precedent, the Board lacked jurisdiction to consider the contractor's various claims of excusable delays that were not previously submitted to the Contracting Officer as claims or mentioned by the contractor in response to the Government's show cause notice, even where the Government was aware of the issue; and (ii) the Contracting Officer did not abuse his discretion by failing to consider the factors in FAR 49.402-3(f) in deciding to terminate because (a) that provision does not confer a right on defaulted contractors, (b) such consideration would have required a realistic schedule from the contractor that it never provided, and (c) the Contracting Officer did consider the factors to the extent the available information allowed him to.

In Avant Assessment, LLC, a decision involving terminations for convenience, the ASBCA held that: (i) it lacked jurisdiction over theories of recovery for alleged additional work performed by the contractor because those claims were not based on the operative facts previously presented in claims to the Contracting Officer; and (ii) the contractor's claim for certain charges did not meet the requirement that they "result" from the termination under FAR 52.212-4(l).

In LKJ Crabbe Inc., the ASBCA upheld the termination for cause of a custodial services contract because, inter alia: (i) the contractor failed to provide reasonable assurances of performance in response to the Government's cure notice; (ii) the contractor's statements amounted to anticipatory repudiation of the contract, (iii) the "Order of Precedence" clause resolved a clear discrepancy in the contract documents regarding the amount of cleaning required; and (iv) the contractor failed to prove that Government knew or should have known of an alleged mistake in its bid. The Board also rejected the contractor's arguments regarding alleged (i) superior knowledge by the Government, (ii) breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, and (iii) unilateral mistake. Subsequently, the Board denied the contractor's motion for reconsideration.

In Ballistic Recovery Systems, Inc., the ASBCA granted the Government's motion for summary judgment and denied an appeal from a default termination because the contractor admitted on appeal that its First Article samples were nonconforming, and its earlier response to the Government's Show Cause notice was inadequate.

In First Division Design, LLC, which involved a contract terminated for convenience after the Government realized it had incorrectly accepted an offer to supply floor tiles made in China, the ASBCA denied the contractor's T for C claim, which was based largely on the alleged delay in terminating the contract and the costs allegedly incurred during extended negotiations prior to the termination, because: (i) contrary to the contractor's contention, the Government was not solely to blame for the  flawed award since the contractor had ignored the applicable trade restrictions; (ii) many alleged procedural errors by the Government in terminating the contract were irrelevant because fault is not usually an element in convenience terminations, and there was no evidence that any of the Government's actions (a) amounted to bad faith or a breach of any duty to cooperate or (b) constituted duress; and (iii) the contractor's complaints about a DCAA audit were irrelevant because the DCAA was only involved after the appeal was filed.

Costs, Defective Pricing, and Cost Accounting Standards (CAS)

In CB&I AREVA MOX Services, LLC, a contract dispute involving cross motions for relief, the court: (i) granted partial summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff/contractor on an issue of contract interpretation, finding that the contract entitled the contractor to retain provisional incentive fee payments until its construction of a Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility for the DOE was completed; (ii) denied the Government's motion for partial dismissal ("The thrust of Defendant’s argument seems to be that Count III is styled as a breach of contract claim rather than an equitable adjustment claim, but this is a semantic distinction without a substantive difference"); (iii) rejected the Government's argument that the plaintiff had failed to comply with the 30-day notice requirement of the "Changes" clause, which the court said "might apply if any change orders existed here, but they do not";  (iv) denied the Government's six-year limitations argument because the plaintiff "could not have known of the breach – and its claim did not accrue – until it knew or should have known that the [Government] would not process a baseline change to add fee to the contract [, and the Government] did not even direct [the plaintiff] to start the rebaseline process until January 2012"; and (iv) held that the plaintiff had the immediate right to appeal an affirmative government claim included in the Contracting Officer's decision.

In Planate Management Group, LLC, the court denied the Government's motion to dismiss parts of the suit for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the factual allegations underlying the counts in the Complaint for (a) breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing and  (b) cardinal change had been included in the claim submitted to, and decided by, the Contracting Officer, even though those two theories of recovery had not been specifically mentioned in the original claim.

In Northrop Grumman Systems Corp., which involved numerous motions by both parties to dismiss various claims and counterclaims and for partial summary judgment on such claims, the court held, inter alia, that: (i) the contractor's claim for a cardinal change was not simply one for contract interpretation, but rather sought breach damages and, therefore, must be dismissed because the contractor failed to specify a sum certain in its claim to the Contracting Officer; (ii) the contractor's motion to dismiss count one of the Government's counterclaims as different from the claim described in the Contracting Officer's final decision should be denied because "the contracting officer’s decision and count one are based on the same underlying theory–failure to perform on time; they seek the same relief–damages for loss of the use of the machines; and they rely on the same comparison between the controlling schedule and the dates the machines were installed"; (iii) the Postal Service's counterclaim for the contractor's alleged failure to supply certain spare parts was materially different from the counterclaim described in the Contracting Officer's final decision because the count before the court was based on a materially different list of parts, quantities, and prices from those listed in the final decision; and (iv) the Postal Service's claim that the contractor repudiated its obligation to provide life cycle support must be dismissed because there was insufficient evidence for a finding of repudiation.

In Tyrone Allen d/b/a X3 Logistics, LLC, the court held: (i) it lacked CDA jurisdiction over claims based on either (a) a decision to disqualify a firm as an approved provider under the DoD's Transport Service Provider program or (b) commercial bills of lading; (ii) plaintiff's non-CDA breach of contract claims were barred by the six-year limitations period of the Tucker Act; and (iii) claims based on an alleged breach of FAR 48 C.F.R. § 9.402(b) must be dismissed because that regulation and others related to suspension and debarment are not money-mandating.

In C & L Group, LLC, and Makko Construction, LLC, the court granted the Government's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the allegations in the Complaint were not sufficient to establish either an express or an implied-in-fact contract between the plaintiffs and the Government, in part because the contracts expressly stated the United States was not a party (even though the Government had to approve, and provide financing, for them), and there was no meeting of the minds between the plaintiffs and the Government. 

Changes/Breach/Contract Interpretation/Defective Specs/Authority

In MW Builders, Inc. f/n/a MW Builders of Texas, the court denied the plaintiff's motion to reconsider that portion of the court's prior decision finding the plaintiff's subcontractor had waived its claims because the release was clear and unconditional and the court does not have jurisdiction to reform an agreement between a prime and a sub.

In Walsh Construction Co., et al., the court rejected all the contractor's claims for: (i) breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing (because the plaintiff's reading of the specifications was unreasonable, and the Government's inspections were of a type to be expected in this contract and were not excessive);  and (ii) a Type I differing site condition involving subsurface water (because the contract did not provide an affirmative indication of the subsurface water conditions, and  the evidence established that the actual site conditions should have been foreseeable to the contractor).

In CKY, Inc., a case involving a construction contract, the court held that: (i) given all the information made available to bidders prior to award, the contractor's interpretation of the subgrade specifications was unreasonable; (ii) the Government was prejudiced by the contractor's failure to provide timely notice of its differing site conditions claim; and (iii) the Government was entitled to summary judgment on its counterclaim for liquidated damages for late completion. The court was unimpressed with the contractor's prebid efforts to understand the task at hand: "Plaintiff did not inquire about, and apparently was unprepared for, the requirements of this contract."

In Peterson Industrial Depot, Inc., et al., which involved the plaintiffs' allegations that Government had breached an alleged duty to maintain rail lines, the court held, inter alia, that: (i) the contract's general reference to the need to comply with "all applicable laws" was not sufficient to incorporate specific external regulations into the contract, and, therefore, the plaintiffs' breach-of-contract claim could not be based on those unincorporated regulations; and (ii) the plaintiffs could not rely on an alleged breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing where the contract expressly disclaimed the alleged duty on which the plaintiffs' claim relied.

Terminations

In Philip Emiabata d/b/a Philema Brothers, the court upheld the Postal Service's default termination of a mail delivery contract because the contractor had failed to provide the proof of insurance and the official motor vehicle driving record required by the contract and because the contractor had provided erroneous information concerning a past reckless driving conviction on its security clearance application form.